As America edges toward major air strikes against Iraq, it is important to consider which of the following statements, on balance, appear more likely to be true than to be false:

  • Such air strikes are extremely unlikely to destroy all, or even most, of Saddam’s chemical and biological weapons stockpiles.
  • The bombing will strengthen, not weaken, Saddam’s hold on power as the infuriated Iraqi people rally ’round their leader.
  • The bombings will give Saddam a plausible excuse to end all U.N. inspections, which he will do, so from that time onward we will have even less knowledge of Iraq’s weapons programs.
  • Especially for biological weapons, which can be produced about as easily as fermenting beer, any stockpiles that are destroyed can be replaced virtually overnight.
  • It is almost impossible to keep biological weapons from being produced, so the major barrier against their use is that any rational leader considers their use impermissible and beyond the pale; if our bombing drives Saddam over the edge, biological weapons will be much more likely to be used by Iraq than they are now.
  • If Iraq reacts “irrationally” to our bombing and launches biological or chemical warheads against Israel, there is a five to 10 percent chance of this escalating into a general war in the region, and a one to two percent chance that nuclear weapons will be used.
  • Extended U.S. bombing of Iraq will make Saddam and the Iraqi people appear as martyrs to large segments of opinion outside the United States.
  • There is at least a serious issue whether the bombing would be a major U.S. violation of international law (which we went in there to uphold in the first place when Saddam invaded Kuwait) if it is not expressly supported by a new resolution of the U.N. Security Council.
  • The bombing will be strongly opposed by Russia and China, and also by major democracies such as France, South Africa and India.
  • The bombing will strengthen ultra-national forces in Russia, increasing significantly the chances that a leader hostile to the United States will come to power in Russia’s year 2000 presidential elections.
  • The bombing will greatly increase grass-roots anti-U.S. sentiment in the Arab world, weakening the Saudi and Egyptian governments and the Palestinian moderates, and diminishing any remaining chances for a Mideast peace settlement during the foreseeable future.
  • The bombing will inevitably lead to mistakes and civilian casualties, which will be flashed around the world on CNN.
  • Paraphrasing what the political sage Walter Lippman once observed (whether fairly or not) about U.S. involvement in Vietnam: It will look like a giant beating a midget to death with a club. In an era when the United States is the only superpower, it will look even worse; U.S. moral influence on the whole range of global issues will be greatly impaired.
If any two or three of the above are likely to be true, it would make the proposed bombing campaign utterly undesirable from the U.S. standpoint. If all of them are likely to be true (which seems, on balance, probable), then “irresponsible” would be the mildest word to describe it. The downside risks appear to be, in brief, 10 times or perhaps 100 times the upside potential.

Roy L. Prosterman is a law professor at the University of Washington.